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Recategorization of Prepositions as Complementizers: The Case of Temporal 
Prepositions in English 
Stanley Dubinsky, Kemp Williams 
In this article we consider the syntax of temporal prepositions (e.g., after, before, while) 
and propose that they differ from nontemporals (e.g., without, despite, about) in that 
they occupy a C0 position whenever they occur before a clausal complement. Diachronic 
and dialectal evidence suggests that this distinction is attributable to a category change 
that the temporals underwent sometime before the 17th century. This analysis at once 
begs for an explanation of the difference between these temporals and the preposition 
for, which also fills C? but exhibits quite different behavior. We first examine the dialectal 
and diachronic evidence for positing a category distinction between the two classes and 
then reexamine an account of prepositions and gerundive complements proposed by 
Johnson (1988). The proposal made here bears on attempts by Emonds (1985) and Grim- 
shaw (1991) to collapse the distinction between C and P. It provides additional evidence 
for the relatedness of these two syntactic categories, but also highlights potential prob- 
lems with entirely eliminating the distinction between them (a direct comparison of our 
analysis and Emonds's is given in footnote 5). 
1 Evidence for Recategorization 
One of the obvious differences between temporal and nontemporal prepositions in mod- 
ern standard English is that only the former can have a tensed clausal complement (la-b). 
At the same time, neither class can appear with an overt complementizer (lc-d). 
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advice and encouragement, the audience at the FLSM 4 meeting in Iowa City, and the following individuals: 
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(1) a. John left after I told him to. 
b. *John left without I told him to. 
c. *John left after that I told him to. 
d. *John left without that I told him to. 
Given the facts in (la) and (lb), it is likely that the ungrammaticality of (1c) and the 
ungrammaticality of (Id) are unrelated. If temporal "prepositions" actually occupy Co, 
then they would not be expected to cooccur with an overt that complementizer, as in 
(lc). If nontemporals are in fact prepositions, then the ungrammaticality of both (lb) and 
(Id) could be attributed to a general constraint against prepositions selecting tensed 
complements. Attributing the ungrammaticality of (lc) and (Id) to distinct factors admits 
the possibility that the two structures need not be uniformly ruled out in all varieties of 
English. Indeed, evidence showing that the grammaticality of these structures varied (or 
varies) independently would support this proposal. As it happens, diachronic evidence 
and dialectal data both suggest that the ungrammaticality of (1c) and (Id) is the result 
of events separated by at least two centuries. 
In certain Southeastern dialects of American English, nontemporal prepositions can 
be followed by a tensed CP complement, as in (2a)/(3a). Moreover, for speakers who 
allow (2a)/(3a), the complementizer can optionally be overt. Alongside (2a)/(3a), many 
of these speakers permit (2b)/(3b), with the overt complementizer that. 
(2) a. %They never came to church without they brought their Bibles. 
b. %They never came to church without that they brought their Bibles. 
(3) a. %Gene left despite John said he wouldn't. 
b. %Gene left despite that John said he wouldn't. 
However, despite accepting (2b)/(3b), which contain a preposition followed by a CP with 
an overt complementizer, these speakers do not accept temporal elements such as after 
and since with an overt complementizer, as shown in (4). 
(4) a. They came to church after (*that) they read their Bibles. 
b. Jane has been lonely since (*that) her husband died. 
If after in (4a) were followed by a CP complement, as without is in (2), then there would 
be no plausible explanation for these speakers' rejecting that following after. If, on the 
other hand, after is a complementizer, then the difference between the standard and the 
regional dialects is explained by proposing that speakers of standard English uniformly 
disallow tensed CP complements of prepositions, whereas speakers of the regional dialect 
allow them. The temporal element after in (4a) is not a preposition, but a complementizer, 
and CPs cannot have multiple heads in any dialect. 
Additional evidence comes from the distinct historical evolution of these elements. 
Although after and before continue to be acceptable with a tensed IP complement, their 
occurrence with an overt complementizer (i.e., with a CP complement), as illustrated in 
(5) and (6), is attested only through the 17th century (see Poutsma 1928 and Allen 1980). 
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Still, the existence of this usage up to that point indicates that after and before regularly 
selected tensed CP complements at and prior to that time. 
(5) It is solde rythe well aftyr that the wole was. (1464; OED 1:168) 
(6) Before that Philip called thee . . . I saw thee. (1611; OED 1:764) 
In contrast, without and besides followed by a tensed CP complement (i.e., that + IP) 
are found well into the 19th century (and dialectally into the 20th). 
(7) ... it was next to impossible that a casket could be thrown into her garden 
... without that she ... should have caught intimation of things extraordinary 
transpiring on her premises. (1853; C. Bronte, Villette, ch. xii; OED XII:226) 
(8) The representatives of the majority, besides that they would themselves be 
improved in quality ... would no longer have the whole field to them- 
selves. (1860; J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government; OED 
1:819) 
There thus seems to be a 200-year interval between the last attested use of temporals 
with overt complementizers and the last attested use of nontemporal prepositions (such 
as without and besides) followed by a tensed clause. This supports the hypothesis that 
the modern ungrammaticality of after that and before that in the standard dialect is due 
to a categorial shift on the part of temporal prepositions sometime in the 16th century, 
and that the ungrammaticality of without that is due to a more recent innovation that 
bans all prepositions from taking tensed finite complements. Speculation that the disap- 
pearance of after that might be the result of some superficial constraint, and possibly 
related to the loss of wh-that, is without basis. Allen (1980) notes that wh-that construc- 
tions die out by the end of the 15th century, whereas after that (etc.) is attested until 
the late 17th century. Under the proposal made here, the ungrammaticality of wh-that 
in the standard dialect has to do with the presence of phonologically overt elements in 
both Spec CP and Co, whereas the ungrammaticality of after that is the result (beginning 
in the 17th century) of two elements occupying the same node. Notice that the former 
constraint still admits dialectal exceptions (Haden 1993), but the latter does not. 
(9) a. %I didn't get why that she was supposed to wait for them. 
b. *They came to church after that they read their Bibles. 
Seeing that this change affected a single semantically coherent set of lexical entries, 
one might ask how critical the role of purely syntactic recategorization is in accounting 
for this change, and whether the category shift might be an epiphenomenon accompany- 
ing some "real" semantic shift. The answer can be found in comparing the evolution of 
these elements with the evolution of another preposition that has come to function as a 
complementizer, namely, for. For is quite distinct from the temporals, as shown by 
the fact that it selects as complements only untensed, irrealis clauses (i.e., infinitivals). 
Compare (10) and (11). 
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(10) a. John danced after she finished singing. 
b. *John danced after her to sing. 
(11) a. *For she would leave early would be a shame. 
b. For her to leave early would be a shame. 
There is thus, a priori, no reason to suppose that the evolution offor should parallel that 
of after and before. The first attestations offor preceding the subject of an infinitive date 
from late 14th-century texts.' 
(12) It is better for a synner to suffre trybulacyon . . . in his life . . . than to be 
eternally tourmented in hell. (1508; OED IV:41 1) 
Following suggestions by Stockwell (1976), the earliest instances of constructions like 
(12) had a structure such as that given in (13), where a synner is the NP object of the 
preposition for and controls a null PRO infinitival subject. 
(13) It is better [pp for a synneri] [cp PROi to suffre trybulacyon] . .. 
Stockwell suggests that for was reanalyzed as a complementizer and that by the 16th 
century (12) might have actually been analyzed as in (14). 
(14) It is better [cp for [IP a synner to suffre trybulacyon]] . .. 
This view garners support from the fact that constructions that require an analysis such 
as (14) do not generally occur until later-that is, until well into the 16th century, based 
on Lightfoot's (1979) citations.2 
1 The use of for plus a bare infinitival, meaning 'in order (to)', is found much earlier and seems unrelated 
to the use of for before the subject of an infinitival. This usage is attested as early as the beginning of the 12th 
century, and for is certainly a preposition in these cases. Sentence (i) provides a 13th-century example of the 
usage. 
(i) He bi gan to schake ys axe, for to smyte anon. (1297; OED IV:410) 
The for-to clause in (i) might have either of the following structures: 
(ii) [pp for [cp[Ip PRO to smyte anon]]] 
(iii) [pp for [NP to smyte anon]] (adapting from Lightfoot 1979) 
In other cases, where for to VP does not have a purposive meaning, it appears to be "part of the infinitival 
morphology" (Lightfoot 1979:187-188). This is evident from the fact that a subject, when it does appear, has 
nominative Case and precedes for. Accordingly, (iv) alternates with (v) in the 14th century, and (vi) does not 
appear until 200 years later (see Lightfoot 1979:186-195). 
(iv) [for to go] is necessary (from 1205) 
(v) [I for to go] is necessary (from 14th c.) 
(vi) [for me to go] is necessary (from 1567) 
2 Lightfoot (1979) rejects the reanalysis offor from a preposition to a complementizer in favor of a different 
approach. However, the approach that he adopts (based on Chomsky 1973) is not tenable within the current 
syntactic model. Lightfoot suggests (pp. 196-197) that in the constructionfor John to leave Comp(S') expands 
to PP, that this PP is headed by for, and that John moves from subject of S to the complement position under 
PP. 
(i) [S[Comp[PP for [NP JohnIl]]] [s t1 to leave]] 
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(15) a. for us to go is necessary (1567) 
b. what would be better than for you to go (1534) 
In (15a), for example, the stringfor us to go occupies subject position and cannot consist 
of autonomous PP and CP constituents. It would appear, then, that the reanalysis offor in 
preclausal position, from preposition to complementizer, opened the way for the temporal 
prepositions to follow. The recategorization of prepositions into complementizers is thus 
seen to be a development in the English language in which semantic factors may have 
played a secondary role, but in which syntactic parameters were preeminent. 
2 Prepositions and Gerunds 
In this section we will examine Johnson's (1988) account of the subcategorizational prop- 
erties of temporal and nontemporal prepositions based on their interaction with clausal 
gerunds. Johnson's proposed distinction between temporals and nontemporals will turn 
out to make the correct predictions regarding the latter, but not the former. 
Johnson (1988) observes that gerundive complements of nontemporal prepositions 
can have null, genitive, or accusative subjects. The gerundive complements of temporal 
prepositions, on the other hand, cannot support accusatively marked subjects. These 
facts are shown in (16). 
(16) a. John left without me telling him to. (cf.... without my telling him to) 
b. Johni left without ei being told to. 
c. *John left after me telling him to. (cf .... after my telling him to) 
d. Johni left after ei being told to. 
Under Johnson's account, the nontemporal prepositions are (optional) exceptional Case- 
marking (ECM) prepositions. Accordingly, in (16b) and (16d) both after and without are 
claimed to have a CP complement containing an (appropriately) ungoverned PRO. In 
(16a) without is said to select a bare IP complement and to assign accusative Case to its 
subject, me. The ungrammaticality of (16c) is attributed to a violation of the Case Filter, 
which follows from the inability of temporal prepositions to select a bare IP clausal 
complement. Johnson's representations are given in (17). 
(17) a. John left without [Ip me telling him to]. 
b. Johni left without [cP[IP PROi being told to]]. 
c. *John left after [cP[IP me telling him to]]. 
d. Johni left after [cp[lIp PRO1 being told to]]. 
3 Note that POSS-ing clauses can appear following temporal prepositions, which is expected if they are 
NPs. 
(i) a. John left [after my telling the story]. 
b. *John left [after me telling the story]. 
We follow Reuland (1983) in accepting evidence presented by Horn (1975) and Williams (1975) that POSS-ing 
clauses are NPs. 
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Johnson derives the requirement that after take a CP complement in (17c) from 
Larson's (1988) analysis of the scopal ambiguity present in (18) (originally pointed out 
in Geis 1970). 
(18) John left after Sheila said he should leave. 
(18) can be interpreted as meaning either 'John left after the time of Sheila's saying that 
he should leave' or 'John left after the time which Sheila said he should leave at'. Larson 
accounts for this by proposing that a temporal operator may be moved either out of the 
clause containing the verb said (resulting in the former interpretation) or out of the more 
deeply embedded clause containing the verb leave (resulting in the latter interpretation). 
The two representations, under Larson's account, are given in (19). 
(19) a. John left [pp after [cp Opi [IP Sheila said [cP he should leave] till]. 
b. John left [pp after [cp Opi [lP Sheila said [cp he should leave till]]. 
On the basis of these and other facts, Larson demonstrates that a finite clause following 
a temporal preposition must contain a null temporal operator that moves to Spec CP.' 
Although providing a very plausible account for the Case marking of subjects of 
gerundive clauses, Johnson's and Larson's accounts of prepositional complementation 
raise at least two objections: (i) If temporals are prepositions that always select a CP 
complement, why can the head of this CP never be overt? 
(20) *John left [after [that [I told him to]]]. 
(ii) If the CP selected by a temporal preposition always contains a temporal operator, 
why can the operator never be overt? 
(21) *John left [after [when [I told him to]]]. 
As Johnson acknowledges, his account does not explain the ill-formedness of either the 
overt that-complementizer in (20) or the overt temporal operator when in (21). 
Accepting Johnson's analysis of (16a) and (16b), let us assume that nontemporal 
prepositions, such as without, select either NP or clausal complements and are optional 
ECM heads in the latter instance (i.e., they can select either CP or IP clausal comple- 
ments). Suppose now (on the basis of the evidence presented in section 1) that temporal 
elements such as after are bicategorial: they can occupy either P0 or CO. When after is 
a preposition, it subcategorizes only for an NP complement. These differences between 
after and without are illustrated in (22).5 
4 Larson bases these conclusions on across-the-board extraction facts, as well as on the restriction of 
interpretations by the Wh-Island Constraint, the Complex Noun Phrase Constraint, and the Adjunct Condition. 
s If one were to adopt Emonds's (1985) program of entirely collapsing the distinction between P and C 
(claiming that all complementizers belong to the category P), then the distinction between temporal and nontem- 
poral prepositions given in (22) would necessarily be stated in terms of subcategorization. For Emonds, sub- 
jectless gerundives are bare VPs, gerundives with possessive subjects are NPs with a phonologically null head, 
and gerundives with accusative subjects are presumed to be NPs followed by bare VPs in which the subject 
NP is Case-marked by the preposition (Emonds does not treat ACC-ing clauses explicitly). In order for Emonds 
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(22) a. without: P, [ NP]j 
[E {CP/IP}]J 
b. afterr: {IP_ NP]} 
The two possible configurations for after are illustrated in (23), with the moved temporal 
operator showing up in (23b). 
(23) a. We threw a party [pp after [NP John's departure]]. 
b. We threw a party [cp Opi [c' after [lp John departed till]. 
In (23a) after is a P and assigns Case to its NP complement, John's departure. In (23b) 
it is a C.' 
The analysis adopted here presents immediate solutions to the two problems cited 
above. First, if after is required to have a CP complement, as Johnson (1988) suggests, 
then (20) should be grammatical. If, on the other hand, after is a complementizer, then 
(20) is an instance of a clause containing two overt complementizers and as such is ill 
formed. (20) is repeated here, with the appropriate structure.7 
to account for these two prepositional classes in modern standard English, the following lexical statement 
would suffice: 
(i) a. without: P, [ NP/VP/NPVP] 
b. after: P, [ NP/VP/IP] 
As (i) illustrates, without takes all three types of gerunds (NP, VP, and NP-VP), whereas after takes possessor 
subject and null-subject gerunds (NP and VP) as well as tensed IPs. Although this lexical statement accounts 
for the distribution of gerundive complements and of tensed clausal complements of prepositions, it leaves 
several questions unanswered. As noted in the text, without takes an IP complement in some dialects of English 
and could also do so in standard varieties of English through the 19th century. In these varieties of English, 
it can also take a clause introduced by an overt complementizer. On the other hand, after could take a clause 
introduced by an overt complementizer only until the start of the 17th century. In Emonds's system (wherein 
all complementizers are Ps), this would mean that both temporal and nontemporal prepositions could, until 
the 17th century, take PP complements, which themselves expanded to RIP. Temporal prepositions lost their 
ability to take these PP complements early in the 17th century, and nontemporal prepositions lost both the 
PP and the IP subcategorizations imultaneously in the 19th century. What is lacking in this alternative account 
is an explanation for why the loss of PP and IP subcategorization was simultaneous in the case of nontemporals, 
and a motivation for the loss of PP subcategorization in the case of temporals. In Emonds's system, to- 
infinitivals are a species of IP andfor-to infinitivals involve a P with a nontensed IP complement. Consequently, 
this alternative analysis would be hard put to draw a direct connection (as has been done here) between the 
contemporaneous acquisition of IP subcategorization by the preposition for and loss of PP subcategorization 
by the preposition after. Finally, there is no apparent principled explanation in Emonds's system for why 
nontemporal prepositions as a class have NPVP (ACC-ing) subcategorization and temporal prepositions do 
not. 
6 It is first proposed in Huang 1982 that preposition-like elements introducing adjunct clauses might be 
complementizers. 
7 Lasnik and Saito (1992) also observe that this structure correctly rules out sentences such as (20). They 
further illustrate that the structure accounts for subject-object asymmetries in the extraction of wh-elements 
from adverbial clauses. They do not suggest that temporals might form a special class with regard to their 
ability to occupy Co, nor do they make any proposal regarding the difference between after and for. 
This explanation assumes that the CP complement of after cannot iterate. Otherwise, we might predict a 
structure such as (i). 
(i) John left [cp after [cp that [lp I told him to]]]. 
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(20) *John left [cP[co after that] [lP I told him to]]. 
The second question concerned the impossibility of an overt temporal operator in constit- 
uents headed by after. In Larson's and Johnson's accounts, a tensed complement clause 
following after contains a temporal operator, and this operator moves to Spec CP. The 
ungrammaticality of (21) is anomalous and must be ruled out in an ad hoc manner, if 
after is a preposition taking a CP complement. This is especially so, in view of the fact 
that many prepositions can take [ + wh] CP complements. 
(24) a. They talked for hours [about [whether Frank ought to leave]]. 
b. I won't bore you [with [why everything is such a mess]]. 
c. I'll have everything ready [by [when they get in]]. 
Under the present account, (21) is ill formed because after is a complementizer. The 
structure of (21) is analogous to that of (25).8 
(25) *John left [cp after [Ip wheni [lP Frank heard the story ti]]]. 
(25) is ungrammatical because the wh-element when has adjoined to IP. In Chomsky 
1986:92 it is assumed (on the basis of data brought out by Lasnik) that wh-elements may 
not adjoin to IP. Lasnik's data are given in (26). 
(26) a. Bill thinks [cp that [IP Johni LIP I like ti]]]. 
b. *Who thinks [cp that [lp whoi [lP I like ti]]]? 
(26b) is ill formed because a wh-element who has adjoined to the lower IP, and (25) is 
impossible for the same reason. Even if the overt operator when did occupy the specifier 
position of the CP projected by after, the sentence would still be ungrammatical. That 
is, the temporal operator must be null, as (27) shows ((27b-c) are cited from Haden 
1993). 
(27) a. John left [cp Opi/*wheni [c after [1P Frank heard the story ti]]]. 
b. [cp Wheni [c that [Ip I was and a little tiny boy ti]]] . . . A foolish thing 
was but a toy. (Shakespeare's Twelfth Night) 
c. %I'll have to talk to the investigator to find out [cp whati [c that [Ip ti started 
it]]]. (Ozark English) 
In (27a) a null temporal operator can occupy Spec CP, but the overt wh-element when 
As pointed out by a reviewer, CP recursion is limited in its distribution and appears to arise only in the 
complements of certain proposition-selecting verbs, such as say and think. This is illustrated in (ii). 
(ii) John said [cp that [cp Bill [P he could never trust]]]. 
Notice that the CP recursion in (ii) is lexically licensed by the V that selects the highest CP as its complement. 
In (i) the CP is an adjunct; and if CP recursion is restricted to arguments, then we should not expect to find 
it in temporal adjuncts of the sort being discussed here. 
8 It is assumed that (i) involves a free relative NP complement of the preposition (not complementizer) 
after. 
(i) After what Frank said to him, Bill ought to sue for slander. 
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cannot do so. This is predicted by the Doubly Filled Comp Filter (Chomsky and Lasnik 
1977) and by Rizzi's (1991) Wh-Criterion (developed from May 1985), which also rule 
out (27b) and (27c) in standard English. However, (27a) with when is worse than (27b) 
and (27c), which are attested in English texts prior to the 16th century and in modern 
American dialectal speech. We would suggest that an additional factor analogous to the 
Wh-Criterion serves to rule out (27a). 
Rizzi (1991) formulates the Wh-Criterion as follows: 
(28) The Wh-Criterion 
a. A wh-operator must be in a spec-head configuration with a [ + wh] XO. 
b. A [ + wh] XI must be in a spec-head configuration with a wh-operator. 
Later in his paper, Rizzi suggests that other features such as [ + neg] might also require 
agreement in a spec-head configuration. Now consider the difference between adjunct 
clauses introduced by when and adjunct clauses introduced by after. 
(29) a. When Harry finished speaking, John left. 
b. After Harry finished speaking, John left. 
c. *When after Harry finished speaking, John left. 
d. %When that I was and a little tiny boy, . . . 
In (29a) the clause introduced by when refers to a particular (singular) instant, whereas 
in (29b) the clause introduced by after refers to a potentially infinite set of instants 
(delimited only by pragmatic considerations). In view of this, suppose that when carries 
the feature [ + sing] and after, the feature [ - sing]. If this feature is also checked in the 
spec-head configuration, then the ungrammaticality of (29c) follows from an agreement 
clash between the [ + sing] specifier when and the [ - sing] head after. Since the comple- 
mentizer that is presumably neutral in this regard, we would expect that (29d) would be 
permissible in dialects where that is also neutral with regard to the feature [wh]. 
Returning to the problem that initiated this discussion, we find that we do not yet 
have a solution for the inability of temporal prepositions to take ACC-ing complements. 
Assuming Johnson's proposals concerning ECM prepositions (e.g., without), Larson's 
proposals concerning operators in the complements of temporal prepositions, and the 
proposal made here concerning the categorial status of after, the sentences in (16) should 
have the structures shown in (30). 
(30) a. John left [pp without [lP me telling him to]]. 
b. Johni left [pp without [cP[lP PROi being told to]]]. 
c. *John left [cp Opi after [Ip me telling him to tj]]. 
d. Johni left [cp Opj after [Ip PROi being told to tj]]. 
Although it is clear from the facts presented above that after does occupy CO, it is not 
immediately obvious why after cannot Case-mark the subject of its IP complement in 
(30c), considering that without can do so in (30a). In fact, if one compares after with the 
134 REMARKS AND REPLIES 
prepositional complementizer for, one might expect the grammaticality judgments for 
(30c) and (30d) to be the reverse of what they are. Consider the facts in (31). 
(31) a. It is impossible [cp for [lp me to leave]]. 
b. *It is impossible [cp for [Ip PRO to leave]]. 
Under the standard treatment, for assigns Case to me in (31a) and to PRO in (31b), 
rendering the first grammatical and the second ungrammatical. Why is this not the case 
in (30)? 
The answer involves Larson's requirement that temporal prepositions obligatorily 
select clauses containing temporal operators. Assuming that something akin to Rizzi's 
(1991) Wh-Criterion is at work here, let us state the following requirement (adapting from 
Rizzi): 
(32) Temporal Operator Criterion 
a. A temporal operator must be in a spec-head configuration with a 
[+ temporal] XO. 
b. A L + temporal] XO must be in a spec-head configuration with a temporal 
operator. 
According to (32), the relation between the operator in (30) and after is analogous to the 
relation between a [+ wh] Co and a wh-operator. In this fashion, a temporal comple- 
mentizer such as after is required to stand in a spec-head configuration with a temporal 
operator. 
Suppose now that we distinguish purely structural relations holding between heads 
and phrases, such as Case assignment and agreement, from the lexically projected rela- 
tion of 0-assignment, in a manner similar to that proposed by Manzini (1992). Expanding 
the scope of relations covered in Manzini's K(Case)-government o include agreement, 
let us define u(structural)-government as follows: 
(33) u(structural)-government 
a u-governs 13 iff at "structurally addresses" ,B, a a lexical head, and f3 phrasal. 
Here, following Manzini, the term structurally addresses is taken to mean 'assigns an 
index of position'. It is assumed that cr-government may be spelled out by agreement 
morphology on the head, Case morphology on the phrase, or a combination of the two. 
We also adopt a principle of unipolarity, such that 
(34) Unipolarity 
If ax X-governs (X = 0 or a) 1, then 13 is to the right/left of at. 
This principle requires that a given head in a given projection govern (in a given manner) 
in only one direction. Accordingly, where the specifier is on one side of ax and the comple- 
ment is on the other, a cannot X-govern both. A given head may 0-govern and ur-govern 
in the same direction-for example, in the case of a V, which both 0-governs and u- 
governs (assigns structural Case to) its object NP. A head can also 0-govern in one 
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direction and a-govern in another-for example, in the case of I0, which 0-governs VP 
and u-governs (agrees with) the subject NP. What a head cannot do is X-govern (where 
X = u or 0) simultaneously in two directions.9 
The Unipolarity Principle (34) can readily explain the divergent behavior of after 
and for. Since after necessarily u-governs (i.e., agrees with) its specifier, in accordance 
with the requirements laid out in (32), it cannot cr-govern (i.e., Case-mark) the specifier 
of its complement. Since Spec IP in (30c-d) is neither 0-governed nor u-governed, it is 
available for PRO. The complementizer for, on the other hand, does not select any 
operator-like element and thus does not u-govern the specifier of its own projection. It 
therefore can and does (r-govern to its right, and Case-marks the specifier of its comple- 
ment IP, licensing the overt NP in (31a). 
The specific requirement in (32) that the temporal operator and the temporal head 
be in "a spec-head configuration" becomes problematic when the temporal head selects 
an NP complement, and we will show that a simplification of (32), in terms of u-govern- 
ment, is warranted. As pointed out by a reviewer, when a [ +temporal] X? heads a PP 
and takes an NP complement, the NP must denote 'times'. Thus, after the news must 
mean something like 'after the time of the broadcast of the news' or 'after the time of 
the receipt of the news'. Now, according to (32), this PP should have the following 
derivation, wherein one type of cr-government (Case marking) is to the right, and another 
type of u-government (temporal operator spec-head agreement) is to the left. 
(35) [PP[NP the news]i [p after till 
Although (35) satisfies (32), it violates (34). Suppose, however, that we change (32) to 
take advantage of the fact that cr-government can work in either direction. 
(36) Temporal Government Criterion 
a. A [ + temporal] X? must u-govern a temporal XP. 
b. A temporal XP must be u-governed by a [+ temporal] XO. 
According to (36), since the complement of after in after the news is itself a temporal 
XP, it can satisfy the Temporal Government Criterion without moving from its Case- 
marked position. In (37), then, all u-government (Case assignment and temporal govern- 
ment) is to the right. 
(37) [pp[p' after [NP the news]]] 
(36) will only force a-government to be leftward when the complement of the [ + temporal] 
9 Under (34), a verb must 0-govern in one direction. Under the VP-internal subject hypothesis, this would 
require that all arguments of the verb be base-generated on the same side. This position is consistent with VP- 
internal subject proposals, such as that of Diesing (1992:23-29), wherein this position is assumed to be 0- 
governed by the verb. Since the position is always empty at S-Structure in English (under Diesing's account), 
it is plausible that the English VP has the following structure, with rightward 0-government: [vp[v V NPOBJ] 
NPSUBJ]. According to Diesing, if PRO is required to be ungoverned and is generated in VP-internal position, 
then it must move into some higher functional projection. German (which has both IP and VP subjects at S- 
Structure) is unproblematic, since the VP is head-final. 
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head is not the temporal XP with which the head must agree. This naturally happens 
whenever the complement is an IP containing a temporal operator. 
Under this analysis, then, after and for can both take either NP or IP complements. 
They differ in that, when after occupies a C?, a temporal operator moves out of its IP 
complement into Spec CP, and the constraint stated in (36) forces it to u-govern leftward. 
This then precludes it from Case-marking the specifier of its complement IP. When after 
selects an NP complement, which must be [ + temporal], it a-governs this complement, 
allowing it to both Case-mark the complement and satisfy the Temporal Government 
Criterion. Since no temporal XP is ever involved with the prepositionfor, and it is never 
required to u-govern leftward, it is presumed to Case-mark its complement NP or the 
NP specifier of its complement IP in every instance. The italicized constituents in (38) 
are those that are a-governed by the head of the phrase. 
(38) a. [cp XPi [after [Ip .. . ti ... I]] 
b. [pp after NP] 
C. [cp for [lP NP . .. 
d. [pp for NP] 
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On Verbs That Fail to Undergo V-Second 
Hilda Koopman 
In this article I develop an analysis for the syntactic distribution in Dutch of particle 
verbs, verbs with an inseparable prepositional prefix, verbs with the preflx her- 'again', 
and particle verbs prefixed with her-. Empirical evidence based on the distribution of 
particle verbs and the prefix her- will establish that the finite verb in nonroot environ- 
ments in Dutch is in situ (or more correctly quite low in the structure). I will show that 
the proposals developed in Koopman 1994 for the way in which lexical properties are 
satisfied yield a direct and simple explanation for the paradigms under discussion and 
solve certain long-standing problems in Dutch syntax. Insofar as these proposals uniquely 
rely on the mechanism of head movement and are intended as a general theory for the 
way in which lexical properties need to be satisfied, the analysis developed here yields 
strong support for my 1994 proposals, which can be seen as a particular implementation 
of Chomsky's (1993) checking domain. 
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